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Perspectives of Economics of Convention on Markets, 
Organizations, and Law. An Introduction 
Rainer Diaz-Bone & Olivier Favereau ∗ 
Abstract: »Perspektiven der Economie des conventions auf Märkte, Organisatio-
nen und Recht. Eine Einleitung«. The article introduces the French approach of 
economics of convention (in short EC), presents some of its core concepts – as 
quality conventions – and introduces some of its perspectives on markets, or-
ganizations, and law. EC is characterized as a pragmatist institutionalism, which 
has conceptions of human agency, rationality, market, organization, state, and 
institution that make EC distinct from other established institutional approaches. 
EC continues structuralist perspectives and shows a growing interest in the social 
theory of Michel Foucault, who worked on power, dispositive, and discourse. 
This article sketches also some newer developments of EC’s research on mar-
kets, organizations, and law and offers an introductory frame for the other 
contributions of the HSR Special Issue. One focus of this special issue is to pre-
sent contributions of members of the second and third generation of EC (as 
mostly formed at the University of Paris X – Nanterre) but also of an interna-
tional group of scholars in the field, who apply EC to the analysis of markets, 
organizations and law. 
Keywords: Economics of convention, économie des conventions, markets, or-
ganizations, law, quality convention, institutions, Michel Foucault. 
1.   Introduction 
In the last decade economics of convention (in French “économie des conven-
tions,” in short EC) has been established not only as a transdisciplinary, but 
also as an international socio-economic institutionalist approach. Starting in 
France in the early 1980s, EC has spread out in European social sciences as a 
perspective to study institutional structures and the pragmatics of coordination 
in different fields, such as economics, political sciences, law studies, historical 
analysis, sociology and statistics (Storper and Salais 1997; Favereau and 
Lazega 2002; Boltanski and Thévenot 2006; Eymard-Duvernay 2006a, 2006b; 
Batifoulier et al. 2016). Thereby, EC has centered on empirical situations, in 
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which actors have to coordinate, evaluate, and interpret to achieve a common 
goal and a common understanding of what is going on. Actors therefore rely on 
conventions as logics of coordination and evaluation as well as on cognitive 
forms and dispositives (objects, instruments, etc.). Also actors rely on conven-
tions to exercise critique and justification or to mobilize collective actions 
pursuing strategies and common goods (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005; Boltan-
ski and Thévenot 2006). Contrary to many other institutionalist approaches, EC 
renews a pragmatist basis for empirical institutionalist analysis.1 This way, EC 
can be conceived as part of the so-called new French social sciences (Nachi 
2006; Corcuff 2011), which contributed to the resurgence of pragmatism in the 
social sciences as – together with structuralism – one of the two mega-
paradigms in social sciences.2 
Contrary to discussions in the humanities, we will not distinguish between 
different forms of pragmatism and structuralism (as poststructuralism, ne-
ostructuralism, neopragmatism). The reason for this is simply that we regard 
these more subsequent terms as expressions of renovations and renewals in-
stead of the emergence of new scientific movements. Structuralism and prag-
matism have been continuously present in the social sciences in the last dec-
ades but in different constellations. In France, EC can therefore be considered 
as part of a critical counter-movement to a narrow conception of structuralism 
also (Dosse 1998a; Favereau 2001).3 As a complex pragmatist institutionalism 
EC emphasizes the practical competences of actors in situations of coordination 
and evaluation. Also objects and cognitive forms – seen as equipment of situa-
tions – are included in EC’s analyses of economic coordination. 
In this introduction, we will sketch some of the foundational positions of EC 
as a frame relevant to the contributions included in this special issue, but also 
                                                             
1  In its beginning, EC referred not to the classical founders of pragmatism (Peirce, James, 
Dewey), but argued in a pragmatist way how conventions evolve and how actors rely on 
them, as Storper and Salais did in their characterization of actors, relying on conventions in 
pragmatic situations (Storper and Salais 1997, 10). Also David Lewis’s post-analytical con-
cept of convention, which is one of the two most important influences (see the contribution 
of Favereau 2019 “The economics of convention: From the practice of economics to the 
economics of practice”, in this special issue), can be conceived as an articulation of a neo-
pragmatist turn in US-American philosophy (Lewis 1969). 
2  For an overview of the development and differentiation of American pragmatism see Mar-
golis (2002), Bacon (2012), Richardson (2014), and Misak (2015). For an overview of the de-
velopment of structuralism and its differentiations see Dosse (1998b, 1998c). Notice Boltan-
ski’s (2011) discussion of the relations between pragmatism and structuralism as well as 
Boltanski and Esquerre’s (2017, 2018) tentative synthesis of a “pragmatic structuralism.” 
Indeed, the founders of EC were more acquainted in 1989 with pragmatics than with prag-
matism. Nowadays, the difference has lost its importance. 
3  But one must be aware that the concepts of convention itself can also be conceived as a 
structuralist one and that there has always been a cooperation between conventionalists 
and structuralists as shown by the project of Favereau and Lazega (2002). 
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for EC in general.4 First, some positions on EC’s analysis of markets and or-
ganizations will be introduced (section 2), then we will sketch EC’s perspective 
on law (section 3) and give an outline of the contributions, gathered in this 
HSR Special Issue (section 4). Finally, we consider new results and new chal-
lenges (section 5). 
2.   Markets and Organizations 
Markets and organizations as “institutional arrangements” are of main interest 
in modern institutionalist economics, socio-economics but also in the social 
sciences in general. In economics, institutions and their design nowadays are 
recognized as explanatory elements, to describe why economies work or fail 
(Williamson 1985; Israel 1987; North 1990; Lin and Nugent 1995; Acemoğlu 
and Robinson 2012). For many social sciences, as sociology, this “institutional 
turn” in economics was no real news, because elsewhere, institutions were 
evident as structuring principles of social reality and therefore as basic con-
cepts for any social science (see for example Durkheim 1982).  
For EC the difference between institutions and conventions is therefore im-
portant. EC makes a first important contribution to institutional analysis with 
its argument that institutions are incomplete in meaning and therefore need to 
be embedded in situations, in which coordinating actors apply conventions as 
logic, how to interpret and handle institutions (Salais 1998; Bessy and Favereau 
2003).5 The consequence is not to conceive markets and organizations in only 
one institutional form and to recognize the necessary combinations of rules in 
markets and organizations with conventions as collective ways to condense 
learning and collective strategies to mobilize institutions. Such ordinary under-
standings of a “market” will be refused, because markets are complex and 
always different combinations of devices, rules, cognitive forms, and conven-
tions. Also “organizations” are not seen as formal hierarchical structures, com-
pensating the lack of control in markets (as argued in economists’ versions of 
institutionalism, e.g., Williamson 1985). EC approaches markets and organiza-
tions from a pragmatist standpoint. One first consequence of EC’s pragmatist 
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Diaz-Bone and Salais (2011, 2012), on law Diaz-Bone, Didry and Salais (2015), and on quan-
tification Diaz-Bone and Didier (2016). 
5  Not to integrate the concept of conventions into the category of institutions also opens a 
conceptual space for the tension between institutions and conventions and the difference 
brings in an explanatory element for institutional analysis and the study of the dynamic 
interaction of institutions and conventions (see Salais 1998; Salais and Diaz-Bone 2011; 
Diaz-Bone 2012). 
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foundation is that EC assumes a plurality of co-existing logics of coordination, 
not only one. From EC’s perspective empirical economies and institutions are 
patterned by different ways of coordination, which precede economic criteria 
as efficiency (Storper and Salais 1997). Another consequence is that EC does 
not see markets as institutional arrangements that are antithetic to organizations 
neither does EC conceive organizations as reducible to markets. Markets are 
organized and organizations cannot be reduced to mechanisms of competition 
(Favereau 1989a, 1989b). Also the frontiers of markets and organizations are 
not clear cut (Eymard-Duvernay 1994, 1997), but should be conceived as 
zones, in which different intermediaries transmit and transform chains of coor-
dination. This way, intermediaries extend the scope of convention-based coor-
dination, and connect different “markets” and “organizations.” 
Nevertheless, EC does not go as far as to blur the distinction between mar-
kets and organizations, which would be paradoxically the position of present 
day mainstream economics. Organizations are actually defined as a process of 
organizing. That seems like playing with words, but it is not. EC has borrowed 
from management research and organization theory the idea that the most im-
portant tool to grasp an organization, especially a business firm, is its process 
of collective learning, that is to say, how it solves problems, and how it trans-
forms individual solutions into collective knowledge. And if we recall the 
introductory remarks on the philosophical foundations of EC (hermeneutics 
and pragmatism), it is remarkable that the most successful model of organiza-
tional learning, that of Argyris and Schön (1978), claims a pragmatist filiation. 
The hermeneutic filiation will appear later when the variety of business models 
is connected with the variety of quality conventions (in the work of François 
Eymard-Duvernay, and Salais and Storper). 
Especially labor markets, their organization, procedures and intermediaries 
have been studied by EC, thereby focusing their differentiation and ways of 
recruiting (Eymard-Duvernay 2012; Eymard-Duvernay and Marchal 1997; 
Larquier 2016). Also EC has done comparative studies, comparing the labor 
market and labor market intermediaries in France and Great Britain (e.g., Bessy 
et al. 2001). Research was also done in the field of legal services, studying the 
organizational form of legal services (Favereau 2010; Bessy 2015).6 Conven-
tion theory has been highly influential in agrarian studies, where agro food 
sectors and global quality chains have been analyzed on the basis of EC (Ponte 
2016; Allaire and Daviron 2017). All these studies have empirically verified 
the pluralist nature of markets and organizations, which means that a constella-
tion of different conventions is the fundamental structuring principle.  
In relation to this result, EC argues that rationality is based on conventions 
(Bessis et al. 2006). As institutions are incomplete (in terms of meanings and 
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significance in situations), rationalities are not a complete human equipment. 
Evaluations, decisions, and calculations need to be based on cognitive forms, 
objects, and conventions. Markets and organizations therefore are social 
spheres (and not only institutional arrangements), which mobilize and comprize 
a plurality of rationalities also. 
Important from a conventionalist standpoint is the contribution to emphasize 
the social construction of qualities in these studies, i.e., qualities of services, 
labor, or food. The concept of conventions is used in EC to demonstrate how 
actors in situations ascribe “qualities” to objects, persons, and processes. In 
French, “qualifier” means to identify, to recognize worth and value but also to 
bring a quality into existence (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). A core concern 
of EC is this kind of reconstructing the mobilization of “qualities,” i.e., the 
mobilization of socially experienced ontologies (actions as services, objects as 
goods, human beings as employees, etc.). Again, from EC’s perspective, ac-
tions (services), objects (goods), persons (employees, employers, etc.) repre-
sent a plurality of possible qualities, because in any market and in any organi-
zation different (convention-based) ontologies are coexisting and the ontologies 
of these entities can change. 
Quality conventions are one of the most successful exports of EC. But that 
could be a source of misconception, by suggesting that quality is an artificial or 
superficial construct. One of the most convenient classifications of quality 
conventions (that of François Eymard-Duvernay 1989) derives from the classi-
fication of “cities” by Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) that comes from a gram-
mar of justification. That reminds us that a judgment of quality belongs to the 
class of normative judgments. Therefore, we are far from the classical (and 
Marxian) theory of use-values, as well as from the present mainstream econom-
ic models of quality. For EC, quality is something out of reach of the homo 
economicus and his exclusively computational rationality. Also, different quali-
ty conventions may coexist in real situations. Actors are competent to assess 
the adequacy of conventions and they are able to cope with the plurality of 
conventions, with their tensions and compromises. 
3.   Law  
Law – as money and language (discourse) – is considered as an elementary and 
foundational institution for any modern economy (Bessy and Favereau 2003; 
Diaz-Bone et al. 2015). Besides the analysis of the organizational forms of law, 
EC studies the plural ways of law production and the strategies actors applied 
in situations in which law was regarded as inadequate, outdated, because of 
social and economic changes. Claude Didry analyzed how labor, before the 
First World War, in the Parisian region, was criticized by the arising new group 
of industrial employees and how new forms of labor law were invented, more 
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adequate to the new industrial labor organization (Didry 2002). Robert Salais, 
Nicolas Baverez and Bénédicte Reynaud (1999) worked on the co-construction 
of the new (statistical) category of unemployment, of emerging industrial labor 
organization and of juridical categories and new law forms (Salais et al. 1999).  
For EC, it is important to conceive institutions not only as different to con-
ventions, but also not to conceive them as given external constraints to actors in 
situations of economic coordination. Instead, EC conceives the reality of insti-
tutions as enacted by actors in situations, i.e., EC conceives institutions as 
internal to actions and not as external to actions. Only institutions that are related 
to conventions and enacted by competent actors in situations have a social 
reality and have an impact as dispositives for coordination (Bessy 2002, 2011). 
Law, therefore, cannot be reduced to an external and given constraint to actors. 
The reality of law depends on the way actors interpret law and its reality. This 
leads directly to EC’s perspectives on the state as the final guarantor of law and 
its enforcement.  
Laurent Thévenot (1992) has argued that the juridical dimension is a possi-
bility for opening and settling disputes by mobilizing courts. Michael Storper 
and Robert Salais (1997) invented the notion of “state conventions,” which are 
interpretive frames for actors in situations to conceive the different modes, 
according to which the state as legal actor will intervene into economic coordi-
nation. They distinguish the “external state,” the “absent state,” and the “situat-
ed state.” 
In some societies, each person expects the State to intervene in the economy 
from a position outside and above the situation of action – this is the conven-
tion of the “external state” which is particularly strong in France. In other so-
cieties, each person expects the State to be absent from situations of economic 
action, and for individuals to work out coordination among themselves – this 
convention of the “absent state” is particularly marked in the United States. A 
third possibility is that the persons involved in economic action (including 
representatives of the State) operate on the premise that the State participates 
in economic coordination but as an equal, neither superior nor absent. We call 
this the convention of the ‘situated state’ […]. (Storper and Salais 1997, 207) 
The consequence is for EC that it is an open question, when and how law will 
be applied by actors involved in economic coordination. A paradigmatic exam-
ple is given by corporate law in the work of Olivier Favereau (2014a, 2014b), 
with his colleagues at Collège des Bernardins. Corporate law for instance does 
not stipulate that shareholders own the corporation (US term) or the company 
(UK term), because it would confuse ownership of a share (which gives some 
controlling powers) and ownership of a person (the legal person of the corpora-
tion or the company) by other persons – which violates a principle even more 
fundamental in our modern western civilization than the property right. Never-
theless, during the 1970s and the 1980s a convention emerged, according to 
which, since the shareholders are the owners of the firm, the management 
should privilege the shareholders’ value. That was taught in all the business 
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schools over the world, and it legitimates, at a conceptual level, what is now 
known as the financialization of the economy. It produced huge real effects and 
finally the subprime crisis of 2007/2008, which is not yet behind us. Now the 
source of this “great deformation” of enterprises is a pure change of interpreta-
tion of an unchanged corporate law. 
So, the content of law is dependent of its interpretation. But that does not 
mean either a complete relativism of rules of law. In the case of shareholder 
value, recalling that corporate law denies ownership of firm by its shareholders 
is nowadays a powerful critical argument of the logic of financialization. 
Moreover, a majority of European countries have pragmatically tried to escape 
the impossibility of devising a legal person including all the human beings who 
empirically engage in an enterprise – by at least allowing board-level employee 
representation (what is technically called “codetermination”). The strong reluc-
tance of employers’ associations to generalize codetermination proves that 
rules of law represent a real constraint prima facie. But the political experience 
of the countries with codetermination is somehow disappointing, in so far as 
the dominant cultural atmosphere remains dominated by the Anglo-American 
shareholder value – a kind of interpretive macro-convention. 
So laws need conventions, which need laws. It is the interplay between both 
that should be the natural field of EC. 
4.   Contributions in this HSR Special Issue 
This special issue of Historical Social Research focuses on recent convention-
alist contributions to the analysis of institutions, presenting also new conceptu-
al developments of EC. It differs from preceding ones devoted to EC in an 
important aspect, because it presents contributions from scholars who are part 
of the “Nanterre group” of EC (see Diaz-Bone 2018).7 The University of Paris-
Nanterre (Paris X) has been an important institution from 1988 until 2016. 
Olivier Favereau and François Eymard-Duvernay,8 who belonged to the found-
                                                             
7  This group can be delimited by pointing to Olivier Favereau, François Eymard-Duvernay and 
the students who were trained and influenced by them and started their own academic ca-
reer. The editors of the dictionary – Philippe Batifoulier, Guillemette de Larquier, Franck 
Bessis, Delphine Remillon, and Ariane Ghirardello (Batifoulier et al. 2016) – may be highly 
visible representatives of the second and third generation. All of them are contributors to 
this special issue. Of course, there are many more scholars in the field of EC, who studied 
and graduated at the University of Paris X ─ Nanterre and have been trained and influenced 
by Favereau and Eymard-Duvernay (as Emmanuelle Marchal, Géraldine Rieucau or Christian 
Bessy). 
8  Olivier Favereau became professor of economics at the University of Paris – Nanterre in 
1988 and retired in 2016. François Eymard-Duvernay died in 2016. See for the contribution 
of Eymard-Duvernay to EC’s establishment and impact at Nanterre Favereau (2017) and Di-
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ers of this scientific movement, trained and gathered many students and later 
researchers at this institution.9 It was Eymard-Duvernay who edited a two 
volume collection of conventionalist contributions (Eymard-Duvernay 2006a, 
2006b).10 More recently, a group of representatives of the second and third 
generation of conventionalists from the Nanterre tradition presented a conven-
tionalist dictionary, covering the huge range of conventionalist concepts and 
research topics (Batifoulier et al. 2016). But still, this part of EC is not too well 
known outside of France, which is one of the reasons why this special issue 
gathers contributions of conventionalists from this tradition. 
The story of the emergence of EC among a group of French economists at 
the end of the 1980s is told in an analytic way by Olivier Favereau (Paris). It 
started from a criticism of mainstream economic theory through a re-reading of 
Keynes’s theory of financial markets, and of the theory of conventions (in 
order to understand language) by the philosopher David Lewis. It is shown that 
conventions put to the fore (social) practices, initiating a new practice of eco-
nomics, which should integrate the concept of dispositive (Foucault). 
As EC has shown, labor markets are not simply neoclassical markets. Guil-
lemette de Larquier (Lille) and Géraldine Rieucau (Paris) empirically examine 
the recruiting channels and the forms of the French labor markets. Investment 
in “forms” is necessary for market actors to cope with and reduce uncertainty 
in (labor) markets. The analysis of relevant forms and recruiting channels is 
used to explain labor market dynamics. 
The contributions from Julia Brandl (Innsbruck), Arjan Kozica (Reut-
lingen), Katharina Pernkopf (Vienna), and Anna Schneider (Innsbruck) work 
on the consequences of convention theory for human resource management, 
thereby relying on pragmatism and on the foundational works of the Nanterre 
group. 
An example for a combination of EC and methodological strategies of dis-
course analysis is given by the contribution of Delphine Remillon (Paris). Fo-
cusing on career paths and cognitive orders in labor markets for valorizing (and 
devalorizing) labor, Remillon examines the turning points of career paths of 
long-term unemployed. She empirically identifies different segments of the 
                                                                                                                                
az-Bone (2018). See Batifoulier et al. (2016) and Diaz-Bone (2018) for a presentation of EC 
at Nanterre from 1988 on. In the last years some interviews with scholars from this tradi-
tion were published, see Favereau (2012), Eymard-Duvernay and Marchal (2014), and the 
interview with Guillemette de Larquier at <https://conventions.hypotheses.org/category/ 
interviews>. 
9  The founders of EC (François Eymard-Duvernay, Olivier Favereau, André Orléan, Robert 
Salais, Laurent Thévenot) contributed to the special issue of the journal in economics Revue 
économique 40(1) “Economie des conventions,“ which was released in 1989 and used this 
label for the first time, although the first publications were published in the early 1980s 
(Diaz-Bone 2018).  
10  This editorship continued the series of publications of collections, which is a prevailing 
format in EC. See also the collections of Salais and Thévenot (1986) or Orléan (1994). 
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(French) labor market, which can be related to a plurality of conventions for the 
social construction of labor value.  
At Nanterre, the notion of “bad convention” was introduced by Batifoulier 
and Larquier. Ariane Ghirardello (Paris) presents this conception and criticizes 
the neoclassical explanation of discrimination. Instead, she can show how bad 
conventions force actors to continue discriminatory practices. Moreover, 
Ghirardello’s contribution illustrates the varieties of conventions EC has gener-
ated. 
One of the developments of convention theory was worked out by Christian 
Bessy (Paris) and Francis Chateauraynaud (Paris). They introduced the per-
spective of the strategic use of conventions and the role of convention in pro-
cesses of falsification and authentication. Their starting point is the uncertainty 
about quality in the context of a plurality of conventions, involving experts and 
law, all involved in quality definitions. 
The analysis of markets, market structures, market dynamics, and market 
processes of valuation is a core business of EC. Luka Jakelja (Graz) and Flori-
an Brugger (Graz) study the structure and dynamics of the wine market in the 
south of Austria (in the region of Styria). They flesh out how the valuation 
mechanisms in this wine market changed and how a crisis rearranged the quali-
ty conventions in the Styrian wine market.  
Franck Bessis (Lyon) and Camille Chaserant (Paris) continue the work on 
the organization forms of legal services (Favereau 2010; Bessy 2015) and 
identify different conventions as logics of organization of distinct ways and 
distinct valuations of legal services. Their starting point is the European liberal-
ization of legal services the induced problems of deregulation. Bessis and 
Chaserant can show that deregulation does not result in unification of forms 
and (logics of) quality of legal services, because competition is mainly based 
on different logics of qualities and not on price.  
In a historical perspective, Claude Didry (Paris) focuses on the relation be-
tween newly introduced labor law on one side and the ways commodities are 
(defined and) exchanged and production is organized on the other side. His 
main contribution is to bring to the fore the new conception of labor, which 
was introduced by new labor laws. So, it is not law describing or regulating 
labor alone, instead labor law should also be conceived as a blueprint for social 
reality. 
Lisa Knoll (Hamburg) contributes an article on the sustainability of markets 
and on state forms of regulation. She studies different mechanisms, which were 
designed to reconcile market mechanism with environmental and social poli-
tics. Relying on the notion of state conventions from Storper and Salais (1997), 
the author argues that welfare markets and their different forms need to be 
understood from the perspective of intervening states. 
Philippe Batifoulier (Paris), Nicolas Da Silva (Paris), and Victor Duchesne 
(Paris) present a historical analysis of the French welfare system. In their anal-
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ysis of parliamentary documents they reconstruct three different conventions, 
an anti-capitalist convention, a solidaristic convention, and a liberal conven-
tion, which were patterning the political economy of the French social security 
system. The authors track the dynamics of the socio-political conflicts, which 
are based on relying in different ways on these three different conventions.  
The phenomenon of financialization is approached from a conventionalist 
perspective by Michael Faust (Göttingen) and Jürgen Kädtler (Göttingen), 
arguing that financialization is not an all-pervasive mechanism and reminding 
socio-economic research to include other influential economic principles.  
To enhance EC’s concepts and also to improve its research perspectives is 
the aim of the contribution of Rainer Diaz-Bone (Lucerne). His claim is that the 
theoretical body of Michel Foucault should be more systematically considered 
also as possible conceptual elements for EC’s research. The article scrutinizes 
not only similarities between EC and Foucault’s work, but also how Foucault’s 
work could complement and ameliorate conventionalists’ research. 
All in all, the contributions in this special issue characterize EC as not re-
ducible to only one notion, to one issue, or to one institutional logic alone. 
Markets, organizations, and law cannot be explained (or optimized) by refer-
ring them to one principle (i.e., only one concept or rationality). The empirical 
reality of economic coordination is dominated instead of a pluralism of struc-
tures. 
5.   New Results and New Challenges 
This special issue is not only a synthesis or a survey of previous or ongoing 
specific French, German, and Austrian researches in EC. By their sequential 
reading and the confrontation of their content, we think, as editors, that they 
collectively bring to the fore new results – but also new challenges – for EC. It 
will be convenient to differentiate between results and challenges on the two 
questions of plurality and reflexivity, although they are not independent: plural-
ity is a powerful incentive to reflexivity and reflexivity may be a supplemen-
tary source of plurality.  
One pillar of EC is the plurality of modes of coordination, whatever mean-
ing we give to this phrase “mode of coordination”: recruitment channels (de 
Larquier and Rieucau), quality conventions for lawyers (Bessis and Chaserant) 
or wines (Jakelja and Brugger), ideological foundations for Social Security 
Systems (Batifoulier, Da Silva and Duchesne), state conventions and their 
translation into types of sustainable markets (Knoll), types of corporate gov-
ernance (Faust and Kädtler), regimes of authenticity (Bessy and Chateauray-
naud), guiding principles of labor law (Didry), compromises versus local ar-
rangements plus market versus bureaucracy (Brandl et al.), registers of 
valuation (Remillon) – nearly all the papers in this special issue refer to this 
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plurality and clearly EC is, to say the least, an economics of variety. This prop-
erty gives EC a huge comparative advantage, among all research programs in 
social science, obviously as a descriptive language, secondly as a theoretical 
language. It allows much more complexity in the behavior of the agents (indi-
vidually and collectively) and in the characterization of the typical situations. 
The standard views of markets (either labor markets or goods markets) and 
organizations (either business firms or occupations) become ridiculously sche-
matic with respect to what EC can tell about each entity. But economics of 
variety has its own dangers, and it is interesting to see how the different papers 
of that issue improve the way of dealing with those risks. 
The first challenge is the vocabulary used to cover such a variety of modes 
of coordination. Convention remains the main key, but it covers objects of very 
different levels, from highly micro to highly macro with many intermediate 
positions. It is not a problem as soon as it is well specified in the analysis. 
Anyway, the capacity to switch from one level to another is one of the most 
fundamental competencies EC – because of its pragmatist roots – acknowledg-
es for human agents. Nevertheless, EC had to distinguish neatly between prox-
imate concepts, like rules and institutions. The authors of this issue innovate by 
articulating more closely conventions, rules and institutions through a system-
atic recourse to the notion of practice. It is highly significant that ‘practice’ 
plays the same important role in a theoretical paper (Favereau) and in an ap-
plied one (Brandl et al.). Another innovation of that issue is to deepen the link 
between conventions and dispositives (including objects and discourses) by 
bringing together EC’s and Foucault’s methodology (Diaz-Bone, Favereau). To 
be more explicit on this new and rather unexpected link, we will have to wait 
for the second theme: reflexivity.  
A second challenge is the tension between two epistemologically different 
kinds of plurality (of modes of coordination): the diachronic one (intertemporal 
variety) and the synchronic one (spatial variety). In a nutshell, it seems that the 
more you stress one, the less you get the other. It is closely linked with the 
opposition between micro and macro – an opposition that looks especially 
clear-cut in economics, but that is probably a problem also in the other social 
sciences (although less formalized). The variety of modes of coordination 
within the same time period are well exemplified by Larquier and Rieucau, as 
well as Bessis and Chaserant, thanks to the plurality of quality conventions, 
along Eymard-Duvernay’s lines. The intertemporal variety is neatly illustrated 
by Didry, whose object is the macro-evolution of labor law, and by Jakelja and 
Brugger, who study a change of quality conventions within the same local 
activity. It is more complex in the paper of Batifoulier, Da Silva and Duchesne, 
because there is a persistent competition between different conventions, but 
according to their analysis, one is dominant within each period. More complex, 
too, in the paper by Knoll, for another reason: the present variety of sustainable 
markets refer to the variety of State Conventions, although those are supposed 
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to be mutually exclusive, at least in their entirety. But the most striking view of 
the tension is offered by the paper of Faust and Kädtler. They give strong evi-
dence of a variety of modes of corporate governance in the last decades, which 
they use against the view of a dominant macro-regime of financialization, since 
the 1980s.11 It is undisputable that (for example) a diversity of micro-economic 
models of business firms make the work of the macro-economist more difficult, 
not to say more impossible – since the macro-data aggregate micro-data obey-
ing different laws of behavior. 
There is no easy exit from what seems a sad dead end, if conventionalist re-
searchers have to buy their rich analysis of the diversity of practices and con-
ventions at the price of not being able to say anything rigorous about society or 
economy as a whole. EC is the economics of variety – is it condemned to be 
the social science of typologies? Once more, EC could find an ally in the meth-
od of Foucault. After all, he simultaneously starts from practices, sometimes 
fine-grained, but that does not prevent him from thinking at a much higher 
degree of generality – for instance with his “governmentality,” of which he 
clearly elaborates different regimes. The condition of validity is then not to use 
the same categories, although they remain anchored in the practices. This con-
dition allows us to throw a bridge towards the latest contribution to EC of 
Boltanski and Esquerre (2017, 495-501; 2018, 630-638), when they conclude 
their analysis of value and markets by promoting the idea of a “pragmatic 
structuralism.” One way of reconciling “experience” and “structure” is to ex-
ploit this specific competence of human agents: creating a “grand récit,” mix-
ing “experience” under the form of microdata and “reflexivity” under the form 
of theoretical schemes (Boltanski and Esquerre 2017, 500; 2018, 636). 
Reflexivity is the second theme for which this issue of HSR brings new re-
sults through the interaction of the different papers – especially the papers on 
authentification in law and markets by Bessy and Chateauraynaud, on discrim-
ination by Ghirardello, on the fraud on wine quality by Jakelja and Brugger, 
and our joint reflection (Diaz-Bone, Favereau) on Foucault’s dispositives. 
Reflexivity should be considered as the second pillar of EC, although it is 
probably less obvious than for plurality, the first pillar. Convention seems 
intimately connected with imitation. Nevertheless, if convention starts with 
imitation, EC does not stop there. And it is fortunate, in the perspective of a 
“pragmatic structuralism,” because without reflexivity, with conventions built 
upon imitation, we would have structuralism without pragmatism. Moreover, 
even in a world of generalized imitation, human mind needs reflexive compe-
tencies to detect new conventions – to understand what is to be imitated, and 
how. 
                                                             
11  See in more detail Favereau (2016). 
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Reflexivity is a more comprehensive concept than rationality. It denotes the 
capacity to look at the world from the outside, for instance to disprove some 
consciousness of the existence of a convention. Of course, if reflexivity was 
infinite, there would be no room left for the functionality of conventions, which 
is to economize attention. Inversely, if reflexivity is zero, imitation is maxi-
mum, and we would be back in a non-human world. So we expect reflexivity 
moving between these two extreme values, and the papers just mentioned are 
together quite innovative by suggesting that the distribution of reflexivity 
among the members of a collective, whatever its size, should be regarded as an 
essential piece of a truly pragmatic structuralism.12 The fact that people follow 
a convention usually without thinking a lot about it opens a space for individu-
als or groups who are quite conscious of that fact, to exploit this conformity in 
the sense of their interests. Let us be explicit: the opposition between a strategic 
approach to conventions (within the theory of games) and the interpretive ap-
proach is a founding stone of EC (see Batifoulier 2001). The nature of conven-
tions according to EC is not strategic – but that does not mean that there cannot 
be a strategic use of the interpretive nature of conventions.  
It is on this point that this issue is innovative. Bessy and Chateauraynaud 
thus show how counterfeiters (“faussaires”) cleverly play with the quality 
conventions followed by the majority of people to deceive them. Jakelja and 
Brugger give a good example of fraud, which is an even simpler (and trite) way 
of playing the same game. Less easy to grasp is the attitude toward discrimina-
tion studied by Ghirardello, referring to the celebrated beauty contest in Keynes 
(1936, chapter 12 – indeed one birth-place of EC). People do not select their 
preferred face, but the one whom they think will be preferred by the majority. 
So in this case, people do not prefer whom they prefer ... because it is their 
interest to do so. That banal split of personality is often a big support for “bad 
conventions.” Educated families living near a school with heterogeneous popu-
lations could simultaneously put their children in a private socially homogene-
ous school, and admit that discrimination – a bad convention, which they may 
honestly deplore – will be reinforced by their attitude. 
Diaz-Bone and Favereau in their papers make the same observation: EC 
could find some inspiration in the work of Foucault. It is a fact that EC and 
Foucault used quite independently but intensely the notion of dispositive. For 
EC, the project was to integrate objects into coordination; for Foucault, it was 
rather to integrate power into coordination. Even if the project of EC was at a 
micro-level, whereas for Foucault, it was at a macro-level, the turn of EC to-
ward the study of coordination, within a capitalist regime,13 is a powerful in-
centive to benefit from the deep insights of Foucault. If we look carefully at the 
complex definition of dispositive by Foucault, what appears is the strategic use 
                                                             
12  See Boltanski and Esquerre (2017, 497; 2018, 633). 
13  Manifest since Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) but present since the beginning (Salais 1989). 
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by a group of people of the regular practices of the majority in order to get 
some results, favoring the interests of that group – but not by directly constrain-
ing those practices, rather by inducing changes in the conventions people fol-
low “spontaneously,” in some determined institutional, legal, and cognitive 
context. The reader will wonder what the mechanisms that could induce these 
changes are. The task looks self-contradictory: how can we modify “spontane-
ous” behaviors? In his last work, François Eymard-Duvernay gives a first hint: 
change the definition of what is (more) valuable and what is less valuable. And 
a second one: call that capacity of change “power of valorization.” The strong-
est form of power is not to give orders; it is to give orders of worth. 
Because we are sensible to the power of ideas, and because we are so grate-
ful for his deep contributions to EC, from the first day to the last one, we dedi-
cate this issue of HSR to the memory of François Eymard-Duvernay. 
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